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“Last week Natalie received a human skull, 
autographed by her lieutenant and 13 friends, 
and inscribed: ‘This is a good Jap—a dead one 
picked up on the New Guinea beach.’”
Life magazine, May 22, 19441
 The May 22, 1944, issue of Life magazine featured a full-
page photograph of a young woman gazing at a shiny human 
skull on her desk. The caption read, “Arizona war worker writes 
her Navy boyfriend a thank-you note for the Jap skull he sent 
her.”2 According to the text on the opposite page, the woman’s 
Navy boyfriend had promised her a “Jap” before he left for 
the Pacific theater, but the armed forces strongly disapproved 
of “this sort of thing.”3 The Life image sparked a debate in the 
public discourse of the United States that became known as the 
“skull question.”4 The controversy revolved around the practice 
of human trophy collection, an ancient martial tradition that 
became semi-popular with American soldiers during World War 
II. In the Pacific theater, many U.S. Marines collected the skulls, 
bones, ears, and hands of the Japanese war dead as souvenirs. 
As these grisly mementos trickled into the United States, they 
captivated and appalled the public, revealing that wartime 
American society was not as unified in its belief in American 
exceptionalism as it might have otherwise appeared. 
 A common belief during World War II and for much 
of the postwar era was that the American people almost 
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unanimously supported the United States and its “noble” war 
effort.5 This widespread perception is commonly referred to 
as the “Good War” framework, and it is through this lens that 
many Americans understood (and still understand) American 
involvement in World War II.6 Edgar Jones, an ambulance driver 
and war correspondent in the Pacific theater, sneeringly labeled 
the American wartime disposition a “holier-than-thou attitude” 
The infamous Life Magazine "Picture of the Week" that sparked the great "skull 
question" and was featured in much of the American public discussion about 
human trophy collection.
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in 1946.7 In July 1944, Charles Lindbergh, the famed nationalist 
aviator, wrote that Americans “are constantly telling ourselves, 
and everyone else who will listen to us, that we are the upholders 
of all that is ‘good’ and ‘right’ and civilized.”8 In the minds of 
many Americans, the power of the United States government and 
military stemmed from a superior morality. The American soldier 
was therefore viewed as the manifestation of the United States 
and its virtues, and the public had a strong, “morally charged 
connection” to American GIs.9 Wartime propaganda bolstered 
this perception by portraying the GI as an American cultural 
ideal and a “first-class citizen” that all Americans should strive to 
emulate.10
 Many historians have succumbed to believing that the 
Good War framework was a cultural monolith for the wartime 
United States. This perception, forged well before the guns went 
silent in the Pacific, was strengthened by a surge in patriotism 
and nationalism during the Cold War, when the first histories 
of World War II were being written.11 Michael C.C. Adams has 
accused most historians of portraying World War II as “America’s 
golden age” and as “a great war… the best war ever.”12 To 
exemplify Adams’ point, Thomas Bruscino has recently argued 
that World War II was an occasion for Americans of all racial and 
religious backgrounds to discover “many of the shared principles, 
assumptions, and biases that united them as Americans.”13
 Not all scholars, however, agree that the Good War 
framework perfectly captures wartime American society. James 
T. Sparrow has argued that World War II was not the “uniformly 
noble crusade” it has typically been portrayed to be, and John W. 
Jefferies has claimed that the idea of the American home front 
as defined by “evident unity and common cause” is largely a 
misconception.14 Careful examination of the public discussion 
of American human trophy collection provides vivid support 
for Sparrow’s and Jefferies’ argument. American society during 
World War II experienced a greater diversity of thought than 
both wartime efforts and postwar histories have acknowledged.
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 The so-called skull question was anything but one-sided. 
This debate involved a spectrum of reactions that ranged from 
awe to total condemnation. The majority of articles written 
during the war, however, expressed at least one of four prevailing 
sentiments: apathy, acceptance, caution, and horror. These 
sentiments were not always mutually exclusive. Many authors 
presented a nuanced view and expressed multiple, overlapping 
reactions. 
 It is important to define these four main terms and 
identify how they usually manifested themselves in the 
discussion. Many articles addressed human trophies with a 
prevailing sense of apathy. These publications treated human 
trophies as unremarkable objects and grouped them with other 
souvenir products of the Pacific War, such as Japanese swords 
or flags. Other articles advanced an argument of begrudging 
acceptance—that while American human trophy collection was 
wrong and detestable, the American mutilation of war dead paled 
in comparison to Japanese atrocities. Journalists also preached 
caution. Some writers openly wondered if the attention given to 
American human trophy collection would undermine the United 
States’ efforts to appear as a force for good. They feared human 
trophy collection could be used as a propaganda tool to stoke the 
flames of Japanese anti-American fervor; the fault thus lay in the 
ramifications of human trophy collection, not in the act itself. 
Finally, at the most extreme, many articles expressed horror at the 
idea of human trophy collection and resolutely condemned the 
practice on the basis of human decency and Christian morality. 
The articles in newspapers and magazines that considered the 
skull question were not just participating in a debate about the 
Japanese war dead. They were also a part of a very public struggle 
to understand American wartime identity. 
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American Dehumanization of the Japanese
“In retrospect it is clear that these attitudes in part reflected an 
undertone of racism and a conviction that the Japanese were 
somehow a lesser form of human being.”
Richard J. Aldrich, The Faraway War: Personal Diaries of the Second 
World War in Asia and the Pacific15
 
 Throughout World War II, the majority of Americans—
whether soldiers, civilians, or government officials—actively 
dehumanized the Japanese. John Dower, a prominent historian 
of U.S.-Japanese race relations, has described the characteristic 
emotion of the Pacific War as “sheer race hate.”16 Not only 
were the Japanese perceived as sneaky, treacherous, and savage, 
but they were also largely treated as a separate species.17 The 
American press and government conceptualized the Japanese as 
animals—the Japanese were varyingly depicted or described as 
termites, rats, apes, monkeys, reptiles, and bats.18 The subhuman 
treatment of the Japanese in the American public discussion is 
best understood using Benjamin Tsubokura Uchiyama’s “Carnival 
War” framework. Although Uchiyama used this framework to 
examine Japanese wartime culture, it can also be applied to the 
United States. These “Carnival War” societies brought the average 
civilian into close contact with the violence and hatred of the 
Pacific War through articles and publications that focused on the 
grotesque and prioritized shock value.19 The American press, with 
articles like “Marines Knock Off Japs at Rate Of 1000 a Night on 
Guadalcanal” and “Igorots, Riding to Battle Atop Tanks, Wipe 
out 1500 Japanese,” trumped up the idea that the Japanese were 
animals to be exterminated in an attempt to appeal to the American 
consumer and captivate his or her interest.20
 This focus on dehumanizing the Japanese and 
spectacularizing the fight against them cast the Pacific War as more 
of a hunt than a traditional war. In the minds of many Americans, 
the object of fighting Japanese soldiers “was the killing of cunning, 
130    Walker S. Schneider 
Skull Questions
but distinctly inhuman creatures.”21 In 1942, the U.S. Marine 
Corps passed out certificates to potential recruits that read 
“Japanese Hunting License,” and declared “Open Season!” and 
“No Limit!” in the corners.22 This probably resonated with many 
Americans because the concept of the hunt was popular among 
twentieth-century American men. The anthropologist Simon 
Harrison has argued that “hunting came to symbolize masculine 
qualities of self-reliance and hardihood associated with pioneer 
times […] the figure of the hunter had an almost mystical 
significance as the quintessential expression of American male 
character.”23 The “hunt” in the Pacific theater, therefore, was 
seen as a mechanism through which young American men could 
prove their masculinity and value to American society. 
 The Japanese did not hold many favorable opinions of 
Americans, either. Fueled by their own perceptions of racial 
superiority, Dower asserts, the Japanese believed Americans to 
be “monsters, devils, and demons.”24 Takashi Fujitani has argued 
convincingly that Dower and other historians of Japanese-
American relations tend to oversimplify and overunify aspects 
of the Japanese (and American) wartime psyche. While Fujitani 
may partially refute Dower, it is important to note that his 
U.S. government propaganda posters 
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argument does not discredit Dower’s larger point: fierce racial 
hatred marked both sides during the Pacific War. 
 These national conceptions of racial superiority created 
a mutual Japanese-American hatred that resulted in particularly 
ferocious fighting. E.B. Sledge, an American veteran of the Pacific 
War, retrospectively observed that this extreme race hate was “as 
characteristic of the war in the Pacific as the palm trees and the 
islands.”25 American war correspondents noted that the fervor 
of U.S. soldiers fighting the Japanese was unique to the Pacific: 
contemporary observers routinely described the nature of the 
war in the Pacific as more “savage” than the conflict in Europe.26 
The word “savage” carries especially heavy connotations about 
the expectations of U.S. conduct. As Paul Kramer has explained 
in his examination of American atrocities during the Philippine-
American War, there was a widespread belief in American society 
that fighting a “savage” war against a “savage” enemy absolved 
U.S. soldiers of any moral or legal restraints.27 They were free 
to imitate the alleged savagery of their opponents. Exacerbated 
by the “Carnival War” press, this cultural perception encouraged 
U.S. civilians and GIs to believe that such atrocities as human 
trophy collection constituted acceptable conduct in a war of 
exceptional savagery. 
 The islands of the Pacific witnessed both Japanese and 
Americans soldiers committing atrocities. The Japanese tortured 
and abused Allied prisoners, while the Allies relentlessly bombed 
Japanese civilian targets. Neither side showed much mercy to 
surrendering soldiers on the battlefield.28 Race hate and atrocities 
in the Pacific War were mutually constitutive, justifying one 
another in a deadly positive feedback loop.29 The atrocities did 
not necessarily end when the soldier’s life did, however. Since 
many American soldiers thought of their Japanese adversaries as 
subhuman and objects to dominate, they treated the Japanese 
dead as hunters would a slain animal.30 Just as a hunter will skin 
his prey, American soldiers removed a piece of their enemy as 
proof of their conquest and superiority. As the war dragged on 
132    Walker S. Schneider 
Skull Questions
and feelings of racial hatred on both sides only heightened, the 
grisly practice of human trophy collection gained popularity 
among American soldiers in the Pacific. 
Human Trophy Collection in the Pacific Theater
“This was a gruesome business, but Marines executed it in a 
most methodical manner.”
E.B. Sledge, With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa31
 It did not take long for the practice of human trophy 
collection to gain popularity among American soldiers. In 1943, 
for example, journalist Richard Tregaskis described a conversation 
he had overheard between two Marines who were about to depart 
for the Pacific in late July of the previous year. The first Marine 
proclaimed that he was going to make himself a necklace out 
of the gold teeth of Japanese soldiers. The second replied that 
he was going to bring back “some Jap ears … Pickled.”32 This 
conversation reveals two aspects of human trophy collection in 
the Pacific. First, it was widespread and popular enough that 
soldiers stationed in the United States had heard of it. Second, 
human trophy collection did not necessarily result from a hatred 
and bitterness developed through months or years of fighting 
against the Japanese; it was a well-established practice only six 
months after Pearl Harbor was bombed. 
 As the remarks of Tregaskis’ first Marine suggest, the 
practice of collecting the gold teeth of dead soldiers was notably 
popular during the Pacific War, but its placement within the 
scope of human trophy collection is unclear. It appears that 
American soldiers viewed the extraction of gold teeth from 
corpses differently from the extraction of other body parts. The 
taking of teeth, according to Simon Harrison, “seems to have 
been largely accepted or tolerated, by both officers and enlisted 
men, but not other parts of the body.”33 This contrast is best 
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illustrated by Sledge’s reaction to his friend’s proud exhibition of 
a Japanese hand. Reflecting on the incident decades later, Sledge 
wrote, “Although I didn’t collect gold teeth, I had gotten used to 
the idea, but somehow a hand seemed to be going too far.”34 This 
is supported by a vignette earlier in his memoir, wherein Sledge 
nonchalantly reacted to a fellow Marine slashing a still-alive 
Japanese soldier’s face open to extract gold teeth.35 The emotional 
difference between gold teeth and other human trophies is likely 
connected to the tangible value of gold teeth. A 1943 article in the 
Los Angeles Times explained that gold teeth had “a definite value 
in trade and barter” among the indigenous peoples of the Pacific 
Islands. Therefore, it is plausible that U.S. soldiers who collected 
gold teeth did so because they were used as a form of currency.36 
There are no articles commenting on U.S. soldiers trading other 
human trophies with indigenous peoples. This suggests that gold 
teeth served a very different purpose than other human trophies, 
which held no tangible value and were collected with the sole 
intention of making them into souvenirs. The skulls, bones, 
ears, and hands of Japanese soldiers were thus introduced to the 
U.S. home front, while the gold teeth remained in the Pacific 
theater and largely outside of the contemporary public discussion 
concerning trophy collection. 
 Sledge commented that the collection of human trophies 
differed from souvenir hunting or looting because “it was more 
like Indian warriors taking scalps.”37 However, the scalping 
popularized in American mythology as a Native American 
practice (British colonists and American settlers participated in 
it as well) was undertaken immediately after the fighting, if not 
mid-battle. The collection of human trophies during the Pacific 
War, on the other hand, occurred “a considerable time after the 
end of fighting, in an activity perhaps better described as trophy-
scavenging than trophy hunting.”38 Usually, American military 
personnel (both combat and noncombat) would return to the 
battlefield several hours after the fighting had ceased to search 
for souvenirs. Japanese helmets, swords, flags, and other pieces 
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of valuable equipment were the most popular items among GIs. 
Those who desired human trophies would cut off the head, ears, 
or hands of Japanese war dead, then wrap the remains in wax 
paper or boil the flesh off to display the bones. Some carved the 
bones into small tools, such as letter openers.39 The practice of 
souvenir-hunting, whether for swords or skulls, was so popular 
that it became a characteristic aspect of war in the Pacific. As an 
astute Associated Press staff writer reported as early as November 
1942, “They said on Guadalcanal, ‘the Japs fight for their lives - 
the marines fight for souvenirs.’”40 
 The question remains: Why did American soldiers engage 
in such a gruesome activity? James Weingartner has argued that 
since Americans viewed the Japanese as subhuman, “abuse of 
[their] remains carried with it no moral stigma.”41 As stated 
earlier, Americans believed their human trophies symbolized 
their dominance over the Japanese enemy. Moreover, Harrison 
has added that human trophies were collected for the same 
reasons tourists purchase souvenirs, “as proof of ‘having been 
there.’”42 As more Americans partook in the practice, these grisly 
souvenirs began to decorate American military outposts or were 
mailed back to the United States as tokens of affection for their 
loved ones or gifts for figures of authority.43
 Human trophy collection was not an uncommon 
experience for U.S. soldiers in the Pacific. Though there are no 
statistics recording the percentage or number of servicemen who 
engaged in human trophy collection, it was “something which 
officers knew to be common on the battlefield.”44 Weingartner 
has called the practice “as popular as [it was] gruesome.”45 The 
collection and subsequent mailing home of human trophies 
had become so prevalent by September 1944 that U.S. customs 
officers began asking all military personnel if they had any bones 
in their baggage.46
 The popularity of human trophy collection among U.S. 
soldiers in the Pacific theater contrasts sharply with its absence 
in the European theater. The historian George Roeder reviewed 
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thousands of censored military photographs from World War 
II and did not find any evidence of American troops collecting 
human trophies from European soldiers.47 Military historian 
Samuel Hynes has written that he has never encountered an 
instance of American soldiers mutilating German or Italian 
dead for souvenirs.48 Both Weingartner and Dower agree that no 
American mutilation or abuse of European war dead resulted in 
any form of a human trophy.49 It is therefore virtually impossible 
to deny that human trophy collection in the Pacific theater was 
largely a racially driven enterprise.50
American Public Discussion
“Possibly it is a heritage of the pioneer days when men took 
what they wanted. Perhaps it’s the false spirit of ‘every American 
a king’ – and the king can do no wrong. Maybe it is just bad 
American lieutenant posing with Japanese skull aboard a Navy 
torpedo ship in 1944
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manners and poor upbringing…”
Christian Science Monitor, November 28, 194551 
 The public discussion of American human trophy 
collection in the Pacific theater peaked in the summer of 1944. 
In late May, Life magazine published its infamous photograph 
of the Arizona war worker with the skull of a Japanese soldier 
that her boyfriend had sent her. In August, the New York Times 
revealed that President Roosevelt had refused a gruesome gift: a 
letter opener carved from the bone of a Japanese soldier.52 Since 
Life magazine and the New York Times acted as major sources of 
information concerning the war for U.S. civilians, their high-
profile inclusions of American human trophy collection brought 
the issue into the national spotlight, sparking a lively debate in 
the public discussion.53
 The idea of human trophy collection, however, was not 
entirely foreign to public discourse in the United States. The press 
featured the exploits of the Igorot people, indigenous Filipinos 
who traditionally dwelt in the highlands of Luzon, on several 
occasions during the early stages of the war. Articles on this subject 
almost uniformly praised the Igorots’ bravery and ruthlessness in 
fighting the Japanese alongside U.S. General Douglas MacArthur. 
They occasionally mentioned the admiration American soldiers 
had for the Igorots, as well as the high level of organization that 
existed between the Igorots and U.S. troops. Interestingly, these 
same articles often highlighted that the Igorot people were head-
hunters. As products of the “Carnival War,” these publications 
demanded attention with sensational titles and subtitles such as, 
“Weapons of Headhunters, Now Aiding MacArthur, Exhibited,” 
“MacArthur Praises Heroic Natives, Who Were Head-Hunters,” 
and “Head-hunters Go Scot Free for First Time in 40 Years.”54
 As the titles suggest, the articles did not condemn the 
Igorot practice of head-hunting, but rather glorified it as a 
product of primal bravery and a crucial aspect of the Igorots’ 
all-out resistance against the Japanese. One writer for the Los 
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Angeles Times described these indigenous allies as “the head-
hunting Igorots of Luzon… [who] are pledged to fight ‘to the 
death’ against the Japs.”55 Another explained how the Army was 
so grateful for the ferociousness of the Igorot people that they 
actually de facto legalized head-hunting in the Philippines. The 
article explained that “the Igorots came marching single file out 
of the wilderness, a spear over each shoulder and a Japanese head 
on each spear. The entire Japanese party had been beheaded.”56 
That was, the article continued, the first time the practice of 
head-hunting had not been punished in the Philippines since 
the United States had gained control of the islands, presumably 
as a thank-you for the Igorots’ bravery. As a result, not only did 
the U.S. military condone the practice in the Pacific theater, but 
the mainstream press also covered head-hunting without any 
tone of disapproval or horror. The implicit support for Igorot 
head-hunting practices is even more evident in a third article 
from the Los Angeles Times. The piece was printed under a large 
photograph of a smiling American woman holding an Igorot 
weapon, described as a “strange, saw-toothed weapon” that could 
behead a man with one strike and included “a hook on the reverse 
side upon which the triumphant warrior tied the victim’s head 
before proudly marching home with his trophy.”57 This image 
Americanized the concept of human trophy collection in the 
public discussion. Seeing a normal American woman smile and 
casually pose holding a weapon used for head-hunting began to 
normalize, if not glorify, the concept of human trophy collection 
for the American reader.
 This encounter with human trophy collection early in 
the Pacific War and its glorification doubtlessly impacted public 
discourse in the United States. The attention and praise lavished 
on the Igorots and their head-hunting probably explains why a 
reader declared the macabre 1944 Life magazine photograph “A 
rare and memorable spectacle….”58 This reaction of awe remains 
an outlier in the American public discussion of human trophy 
collecting, but it is not difficult to account for its origins. The 
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author, along with many of his fellow Americans, presumably 
compared the American soldiers’ trophy collection to Igorot 
head-hunting. The nearly universal praise for the “Proud Savage 
Warriors” of the Philippines presents a new twist on Kramer’s 
theory of “savage” war.59 Beyond simply imitating the savagery 
of their enemies, Americans consumed news that condoned the 
savagery of their allies. As a consequence, GIs were even more 
absolved of moral or legal condemnation because their allies had 
already received national praise for committing such atrocities. If 
American society accepted head-hunting as a result of the “‘sheer 
breath-taking and heart stoppin’ acts of heroism” of the Igorots, 
then human trophy collection was logically understood as the 
result of Americans undertaking similar feats of bravery in the 
same theater against the same enemy.60 
Apathy
 
 The “Carnival War” framework and the enthusiasm 
shown for Igorot head-hunting help explain why much of the 
public discussion reflected desensitization to the grotesque 
practice of human trophy collection. Often, the skulls, ears, 
bones, and other body parts collected by American soldiers 
were discussed or mentioned as ordinary souvenirs. In a 1944 
Washington Post column describing the assortment of souvenirs 
that American civilians received from their loved ones fighting 
overseas, the mention of a Japanese skull is entirely brushed 
over. The article reads, “Atlanta reported the recent receipt of 
a Japanese skull and two live love birds; Tampa, painted emu 
eggs and bronze Tunisian daggers, and San Francisco miniature 
outrigger canoes from New Guinea.”61 Aside from being the first 
object mentioned, the Japanese skull is paid no more attention 
than are the painted emu eggs or bronze Tunisian daggers. This 
casual comparison of human trophies to other war souvenirs 
again appears in an article about Marine souvenir culture in the 
Pacific: 
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Cigarettes, matches, soft drinks and the other 
luxuries have their values, too. The Marines will 
trade any sort of battle souvenir available for 
whatever a traveler has in his bag. And if the 
leathernecks are short of souvenirs one of them 
will go out into the jungle, waylay a Jap and 
bring back his ears, if that is  what you want.62
In this article, not only are human trophies apathetically 
mentioned, but the act of attaining them is, too. The military 
publication Leatherneck published an anonymous letter 
describing human trophy collection. The letter described a young 
man’s friend, Stanley, who had collected eleven Japanese ears. As 
if acknowledging his own apathetic tone, the author attempted 
to normalize Stanley’s grotesque collection by explaining, “It was 
not disgusting, as it would be from the civilian point of view. 
None of us became emotional over it.”63 
 Still, it appears that civilians, even when considering 
human trophies outside of the realm of souvenirs, did not find the 
practice as appalling as the author might have believed. Another 
article published a month earlier presented a humorous anecdote 
of an Australian skull trophy. “Claudius, the talking skull,” the 
article began, “has lost his voice.”64 The piece goes on to discuss 
how an officer with a talent for ventriloquism used to regale the 
indigenous islanders until he was moved to another station. The 
article focuses on the humorous story, not the existence of the 
skull trophy in an Allied military outpost. This sense of apathy 
characterized much of the public discussion regarding human 
trophies, which often treated them as unremarkable objects. 
Acceptance
 
 In his travels around the Pacific theater, Charles Lindbergh 
noticed that American atrocities were excused because they were 
considered acceptable in comparison to Japanese atrocities. 
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Lindbergh described a perfect example of Kramer’s “savage” war 
theory. In his journal he wrote, “A Japanese soldier who cuts 
off an American soldier’s head is an Oriental barbarian… An 
American soldier who slits a Japanese throat ‘did it only because 
he knew the Japs had done it to his buddies.’”65 Despite this 
criticism, Lindbergh himself conceded, “But barbaric as our men 
are at times, the Orientals appear to be worse.”66
 This acceptance of American barbarism was also prevalent 
in the American public discussion at large. Even though many 
publications criticized human trophy collection, they tolerated 
the practice because it was viewed as less “barbaric” than the 
atrocities the Japanese had committed. One column confidently 
declared, “But, when all is said and done, our barbarisms are 
pretty pallid by comparison with theirs [the Japanese], and the 
stories from the Pacific… put a gap between the standards of the 
two countries.”67 Even the president of the Federal Council of 
the Churches of Christ in America, the Right Reverend Henry 
St. George Tucker, acknowledged that American human trophy 
collection had been provoked by Japanese atrocities.68 Another 
article used an example from Japanese history—“when centuries 
ago a Japanese invader of Korea brought back thousands of 
pickled human ears as trophies”—to justify American atrocities 
(including human trophy collection) in the Pacific War.69 This 
sense of acceptance did not go unnoticed. Writing in the Atlantic 
Monthly only six months after the Japanese surrender, Edgar Jones 
accused the American media of publicizing Japanese atrocities 
to justify moments of American “moral frailty.”70 These aspects 
of the contemporary American public discussion also fit within 
Kramer’s “savage” war theory. Articles tolerated human trophy 
collection because they perceived it to be a justified response to the 
Japanese atrocities, which were always portrayed as more brutal 
and cruel than anything ordinary Americans could imagine.
Caution
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 Many other writers were quick to condemn American 
human trophy collection because evidence of the practice, such 
as the Life magazine photograph, was a Japanese propagandist’s 
dream. One letter to the editor of Life condemned the publication 
of the image because the author believed the Japanese would use the 
photograph “potently… for anti-allied propaganda.”71 Another 
submission thoughtfully considered the hypothetical American 
response if “one of the most prominent magazines in Tokyo 
published the picture of a young Japanese girl in such a pose.”72 
The writer claimed that a “storm of protest at such savagery” 
would consume American society in hatred for all Japanese.73 
Since much of American psychological warfare was geared 
towards convincing Japanese civilians and soldiers to surrender to 
the United States, journalists warned that the public discussion 
of human trophy collection would prove counterproductive 
to American strategy.74 One article even directly accused Life 
magazine of undoing the efforts of American psychological 
warfare.75 Additionally, many feared publicizing these human 
trophies would provoke violence against the American prisoners 
of war held by the Japanese.76 In an article in the New York 
Times, Reverend Tucker bemoaned the fact that “reports of such 
conduct have the effect of stiffening morale in enemy countries 
and of engendering feelings of hatred.”77 It is therefore important 
to understand that the fear of a potential Japanese reaction to 
American human trophy collection influenced many of the 
negative reactions towards American human trophy collecting.
Horror
 
 The final widespread sentiment that characterized the 
great skull debate was horror. The Life magazine photograph and 
the letter opener intended for President Roosevelt both received 
strong condemnations. One of the letters to the editor called the 
Life photograph “revolting and horrible,” while another declared, 
“The head of the Navy lieutenant mentioned is without a doubt 
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as empty as the skull pictured on the desk.”78 In a Washington Post 
article entitled “Atrocity Tale,” the author disavowed the letter 
opener sent to Roosevelt. The article described the object as “a 
rather nasty variety of barbarism” and congratulated Roosevelt’s 
refusal of it, stating that the president “did exactly what any 
man of civilized instincts would have done in his place.”79 Edgar 
Jones claimed human trophies were produced from “the blackest 
depths of bestiality.”80 A reporter, Enoc Waters Jr., expressed 
similar horror in his coverage of postwar racial tensions for the 
Chicago Defender, a newspaper dedicated to a primarily African-
American readership. In one article about the lynching of a 
young African-American man, Waters wrote that the “primal 
savagery” of the lynching reminded him of his experience with 
human trophy collection as a war correspondent in the Pacific 
theater. With a disgusted tone, Waters described the American 
soldiers as “ignorant Southern backwoodsmen” who believed 
“the Japanese were subhumans who had the audacity to match 
themselves against white men.”81
 Many of the horrified responses to American human 
trophy collection were particularly impacted by a sense of 
Christian morality. In his article, Weingartner described how 
American religious organizations quickly and vigorously 
condemned the practice of human trophy collection. Reverend 
Tucker declared that human trophies “cannot but be condemned 
not only from the standpoint of Christian ethics but also out 
of respect for the canons of human decency.”82 Indeed, it also 
appears that President Roosevelt’s refusal of the letter opener was 
at least partially influenced by religion. Information regarding 
his refusal of the letter opener “was made available here after 
the Vatican News Service in Rome said the recent publication 
of a story about the letter opener had resulted in a request from 
the Catholic Archbishop of Tokyo for ‘respect for the laws of 
humanity even in total war.’”83 While there were many non-
religious reactions of horror to human trophy collection in 
American public discussion, a significant portion of responses 
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that condemned human trophy collection evoked some degree of 
Christian morality in order to justify their disapproval. Implicit 
in these reactions was a comparison between Christianity 
and Shintoism. Since Shintoism, the state religion of Japan, 
supposedly tolerated Japanese atrocities, these articles insinuated 
that the strong Christian condemnation of American atrocities 
proved Christianity to be the more moral religion. Thus, even in 
the most critical responses to human trophy collection, Americans 
still attempted to assert their superiority over the Japanese. 
 
The Military’s Response
“The army has gotten the holy jitters about the skull 
question…”
John Gaitha Browning’s Diary, October 3, 194484
 The U.S. military leadership’s response to the skull 
question and its public discussion was characterized by both 
caution and horror but largely failed to stop the practice. 
According to Weingartner, the initial military response reflected 
more horror than caution. U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. 
Marshall allegedly became aware of American human trophy 
collecting in late 1943 and radioed General MacArthur about 
the “concern over current reports of atrocities committed by 
American soldiers.”85 The Joint Chiefs of Staff soon afterwards sent 
a directive to all theater commanders in January 1944 forbidding 
human trophy collection in the Pacific and any shipment of the 
souvenirs back to the United States.86 The publication of the Life 
magazine photograph sparked a flurry of responses from military 
leaders. Major General Myron C. Cramer, the Army’s judge 
advocate general, quickly dispatched a memorandum to the War 
Department leadership. He condemned the practice because 
it violated the 1929 Geneva Convention’s clause regarding 
maltreatment of enemy war dead, as well as the “sensibilities of all 
civilized peoples.”87 Rear Admiral Thomas L. Gatch, the Navy’s 
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judge advocate general, recommended to Admiral Ernest J. King, 
the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, actions to quash the practice 
of human trophy collection out of fear that the attention given to 
the grisly souvenirs would result in retaliation by the Japanese.88 
The War Department shared the Navy’s concern regarding possible 
retaliation. The director of the Army’s Bureau of Public Relations 
was instructed by a War Department bureaucrat to inform U.S. 
publishers that printing stories about American human trophy 
collection “would likely encourage the enemy to take reprisals 
against American dead and prisoners of war.”89 These different 
responses by the U.S. military shared similar features to some of 
the aspects that dominated the contemporary public discussion. 
While the Army’s memorandums almost exclusively reflected a 
horrified reaction to human trophy collection, the Navy’s and the 
War Department’s documents are marked by caution and reveal 
a preoccupation with the fear of Japanese retribution. 
 Despite their efforts, these military directives soon 
proved to be ineffective. While the leadership was “vigorously 
enforcing a ‘no skulls’ policy and making efforts to discourage 
the defiling of enemy dead,” the soldiers in the Pacific theater 
were largely unaffected by the policy changes.90 Harrison cites 
a veteran who claimed that “his officers never encouraged the 
collection of skulls and teeth, but never tried to prevent it either, 
even when orders came forbidding the ownership of skulls.”91 
Sledge recounted that when an officer encountered a severed 
Japanese hand, his only reaction was, “throw that thing away 
before it begins to stink.”92 There was no condemnation of the 
action, only of the smell. Lindbergh noted a similar failure to 
enforce the “no skulls” policy. In August 1944, he wrote about 
seeing a Japanese skull decorating a blackboard in an officer’s 
tent and hearing about a certain patrol that had carved the thigh 
bones of Japanese soldiers into pen holders and paper knives.93 
The “number of absurd threats for possession of Japanese bones, 
teeth, etc.” had very little impact on the soldiers of the Pacific 
theater, and the practice of human trophy collection was largely 




“Let us hope, however, that the person who sent this gruesome 
trophy to the White House was not an American soldier”
Washington Post, August 12, 194495
 
 The skull question is largely forgotten today.96 For all 
of the blatant and widespread dehumanizing of the Japanese, 
postwar Americans suddenly became ashamed of their human 
trophy collection. The human trophies sent home from the 
Pacific theater did not become objects of display like the other 
souvenirs of World War II.97 The hands, ears, and skull that were 
so proudly mailed home by U.S. GIs were quietly stored in trunks 
or unceremoniously returned to Japan.98 However, the practice 
of human trophy collection was not totally eradicated from 
American military culture; there were several notable cases of 
American soldiers collecting human trophies during the Vietnam 
War.99 The skull question resists didactic categorization; it was 
neither an American moral awakening nor a robust endorsement 
of human trophy collection. 
 Instead, the skull question is best understood as a site 
to puncture the Good War mythology that was pervasive in 
wartime society and has persisted in historical scholarship. The 
journalists who participated in the skull debate were grappling 
with both the issue of human trophy collection and their own 
national identity. In World War II, Americans were divided on 
the question of whether American exceptionalism was always a 
legitimate justification for U.S. actions. The skull question serves 
as a valuable reminder that the civilian body was not wholly 
unified in its belief in a superior American morality. As a result, 
many Americans refused to accept the actions and behavior 
of U.S. soldiers in the Pacific theater blindly. Even during the 
so-called “best war ever,” Americans and their press actively 
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questioned and challenged what it meant to be an American at 
war. 
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